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Collecting personal data is a feature of daily life. Businesses, advertisers,
agencies, and law enforcement officers amass massive reservoirs of our personal data. This state of affairs—what I am calling the “collection imperative”—is justified in the name of efficiency, convenience, and security. The unbridled collection of personal data, however, leads to abuses. Public and
private entities have disproportionate power over individuals and groups
whose information they have amassed. Nowhere is that power disparity more
evident than the State’s surveillance of the indigent. Poor mothers in particular have vanishingly little privacy. Whether or not poor mothers receive subsidized prenatal care, the existential state of poor mothers is persistent and indiscriminate State surveillance.
Professor Khiara Bridges’s book, The Poverty of Privacy Rights, advances
the project of securing privacy for the most vulnerable among us. It argues
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that poor mothers have a constitutional right not to be known if the State’s data collection efforts demean and humiliate them for no legitimate purpose. This
Book Review situates the book’s contributions in light of another era’s due
process revolution. Fifty years ago, Professor Charles Reich’s scholarship
provided a theory for why government entitlements for the poor deserved the
same protection as those provided the wealthy. His scholarship fundamentally
changed the way the Supreme Court understood the procedural due process
rights of the poor. Now, as then, Professor Bridges’s scholarship has the potential to transform our conception of substantive due process protections for
indigent mothers.
The Poverty of Privacy Rights provides an important lens for rethinking the
data collection imperative more generally. It supplies a theory not only on
which a constitutional right to information privacy can be built but also on
which positive law and norms can develop. Concepts of reciprocity may provide another analytical tool to understand a potential right to be as unknown
to government as it is to us.
INTRODUCTION
Collecting personal data is a feature of daily life.1 Businesses collect massive amounts of information about consumers’ likes and dislikes, strengths and
weaknesses.2 Online behavioral advertisers have copious records of individuals’ searches, purchases, musings, and wish lists.3 Law enforcement aggregates
video streams from public and private security cameras, images from licenseplate readers, and data from government and private databases.4 Federal and
state agencies amass dossiers on individuals in connection with decisions about
employment, licenses, contracts, public benefits, travel, and taxes.5

1

See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY
EVERYDAY LIFE 1 (2012) (“Over the last two decades, the rapid evolution of networked
information and communication technologies has catalyzed equally rapid change in the organization of economic and social activity.”); Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger:
The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L.
REV. 241, 244 (2007) (“Today, databases of personal identifying information in the private
sector ensure the seamless flow of commerce.”).
2
See JOSEPH TUROW, THE AISLES HAVE EYES: HOW RETAILERS TRACK YOUR SHOPPING,
STRIP YOUR PRIVACY, AND DEFINE YOUR POWER 1-3 (2017); Ryan M. Calo, Digital Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 995 (2014) (“Today’s companies fastidiously study
consumers and, increasingly, personalize every aspect of the consumer experience.”).
3
See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS
DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORLD 1 (2011).
4
See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 62, 66 (2013) (explaining that law enforcement aggregates and analyzes video
streams to create 24/7 surveillance systems).
5
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 2-3 (2004) (“[A]n ever-growing series of records is created about almost
OF

2018]

A POOR MOTHER’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY

1141

This state of affairs—what I am calling the “collection imperative”—is justified in the name of efficiency, convenience, and security.6 Retailers recommend gifts based on the recipients’ online activities.7 Startups promise to use
our genetic data to personalize dining options and family planning.8 Law enforcement tracks individuals who have been flagged as likely to commit
crimes.9 Federal agencies assign “risk assessment scores” to travelers.10
American law has largely tolerated this approach. In the United States, information privacy law generally focuses on the transparency, security, and disclosure of personal data.11 The general assumption is that the collection of personal data is optimal for social welfare.12 Everyone is better off if gifts are
enjoyed, diseases are prevented, and criminals are caught, terrorists are stopped
from flying, and citizens are provided with appropriate services. At most, the
law addresses downstream problems associated with databases of personal data.13
every facet of a person’s life. As businesses and the government increasingly share personal
information, digital dossiers about nearly every individual are being assembled.”).
6
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 19 (2014) (arguing that big data developments are allowing problems to be viewed in new light); Jonathan Shaw, Why Big Data Is
a Big Deal, HARV. MAG. (Mar.–Apr. 2014), https://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-bigdata-is-a-big-deal [https://perma.cc/7XPW-KB5T] (arguing that big data is justified on
grounds that it creates innovative solutions to societal problems).
7
See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 6 (explaining that companies “make purchase suggestions
based on the prior interests of one customer as compared to millions of others”).
8
Alexandra Ossola, These DNA Diet Apps Want to Rule Your Health, WIRED, (May 1,
2017, 12:00 AM) https://www.wired.com/2017/05/these-dna-diet-apps-want-to-rule-yourhealth/.
9
See ANDREW G. FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE,
AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 8-9 (2017).
10
EPIC v. CBP (Analytical Framework for Intelligence), ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/afi/#documents [https://perma.cc/9S22-4SAK] (explaining that
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Analytical Framework for Intelligence uses personally identifiable information from government and private data sources to identify threats to
security); see U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY
IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLIGENCE 1-2 (2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_cbp_afi_june_2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EV8-ND5Y] (explaining methods used by Customs and Border Protection to assess individuals for risk).
11
See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 763 (2016).
12
See WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 382-83 (2016)
(“[I]ncreased processing and use of personal data is inevitable and offers enormous value to
society.”).
13
Cf. id. at 383 (“Ideally, privacy law seeks to maximize [benefits of data collection] and
reduce risks of harm, of course. When it comes to governing data processing and use, this
balance is not always so easy to achieve.”).
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The unbridled collection of personal data, however, can and does lead to
abuses. Government and businesses obtain disproportionate power over individuals and groups whose information they have amassed.14 As Neil Richards
and Woodrow Hartzog explain, individuals are “vastly less powerful than the
government and corporate institutions that create and control digital technologies and the personal data on which those technologies run.”15
Nowhere is that power disparity more evident than the State’s surveillance
of society’s most vulnerable members. The poor, unlike the affluent, are subject to unlimited state surveillance.16 The merger of big data and law enforcement results in persistent, indiscriminate surveillance of poor communities.17
Public benefits programs subject the poor to ever more intrusive and demeaning interrogations and inspections.18 A recent example is Wisconsin’s mandatory drug testing of food-stamp recipients.19
When it comes to poor mothers specifically, the State’s data collection efforts are boundless and inescapable.20 If poor mothers obtain government assistance for medical care, every aspect of their life is interrogated, and every data
point is collected.21 On the other hand, if poor mothers decline to pursue Medicaid benefits to protect their privacy, the State’s child protective services train
their eyes on them.22 As a result, poor mothers find themselves under state surveillance whether or not they receive government-funded prenatal care.23

14
See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936-37
(2013) (explaining how government and business obtain data for “purposes of influence,
management, protection or direction.” (internal quotation omitted)).
15
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J.
1180, 1183 (2017).
16
See JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR 2-3 (2001).
17
Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV.
1389, 1389-90 (2012) (“[The poor] endure a barrage of information-collection practices that
are far more invasive and degrading than those experienced by their wealthier neighbors.”);
see also FERGUSON, supra note 9, at 47, 73-76 (explaining that “predictive policing” methods use criteria that adversely affect poor communities).
18
See GILLIOM, supra note 16, at 1-5 (describing how monitoring systems associated
with welfare programs allow welfare and law enforcement authorities to routinely conduct
surveillance of poor individuals).
19
Jim Cole, Scott Walker Moves Forward with Plan to Drug Test Food Stamp Users,
CBS NEWS (Dec. 9, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/scott-walker-movesforward-with-plan-drug-test-food-stamp-users/ [https://perma.cc/3T3B=7DJB].
20
See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 1-5 (2017).
21
See id.
22
See id. at 1-2, 115-116 (explaining that criteria for what constitutes child abuse defines
many attributes that are essentially synonymous with being poor, thereby forcing pregnant
mothers to either accept state aid or run risk of committing child neglect).
23
See id. at 148-49.
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Professor Khiara Bridges’s book, The Poverty of Privacy Rights, is an important step in developing “a bill of rights for the disinherited.”24 Building on
her findings in Reproducing Race: An Ethnography of Pregnancy as a Site of
Racialization,25 Professor Bridges explains that state surveillance of poor
mothers is premised on the moral construction of poverty rather than on legitimate concerns about prenatal care or successful parenting. Poor mothers are
subjected to invasive state surveillance because their character is seen as defective and norm-breaking.26 The Poverty of Privacy Rights contends that the constitutional right to information privacy should be understood to limit the State’s
collection of personal data from poor mothers.27 Recognizing a zone of privacy
is essential for a poor mother’s dignity, autonomy, and capacity for selfgovernance.28
This Book Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses the central arguments and contributions of The Privacy of Poverty Rights. Part II situates the
book’s contributions in light of another era’s due process revolution. Fifty
years ago, Professor Charles Reich’s scholarship provided a theory for why
government entitlements for the poor and the wealthy equally deserved protection.29 His scholarship fundamentally changed the way the Supreme Court understood the procedural due process rights of the poor.30 Professor Bridges’s
scholarship has the potential to transform our conception of substantive due
process protections for indigent mothers. Part II also sketches out a reform
agenda that reaches beyond the Constitution. Part III frames the book’s contributions in light of broader concerns about technologies of perfect surveillance.
It extends the conversation to concepts of reciprocity and a potential right to be
as unknown to government as it is to us.
I.

PRIVACY RIGHTS AND POOR MOTHERS

Poor mothers have vanishingly little privacy. In exchange for government
assistance with prenatal care, the State demands information about every detail
of poor mothers’ lives. It collects information about poor mothers’ life experi-

24

Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1257 (1965).
25
See generally KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF
PREGNANCY AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION (2011).
26
See infra Section I.A (describing invasive assessments that State requires poor mothers
to undergo when seeking healthcare).
27
See infra Section I.B (considering State’s surveillance of poor mothers in light of Supreme Court’s recognition of right to privacy).
28
See infra notes 108-109, 164and accompanying text (explaining that privacy fosters
autonomy, dignity, and self-governance).
29
See infra Section II.A (describing influence of Professor Charles Reich’s The New
Property).
30
See infra note 151 and accompanying text (noting that Supreme Court cited Reich’s
work in deciding scope of due process property rights).
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ences, bodies, and homes.31 The Poverty of Privacy Rights explores the harm
of such surveillance and why the Constitution should be understood to limit the
State’s data collection practices. This Part highlights the book’s contribution to
our understanding of the moral foundation and legal significance of the State’s
surveillance of poor mothers.
A.

Dispossession

When pregnant women seek government assistance for medical care, the
State demands a dizzying array of personal information.32 In addition to the
expected health exams to determine pregnant women’s physical health, state
Medicaid rules require assessments of their “nutritional status, health education
status, and psychosocial status.”33 Data is collected about poor pregnant women’s “formal education and reading level,” “religious and cultural influences,”
“history of previous pregnancies,” “general emotional status and history,”
“wanted or unwanted pregnancy,” “personal adjustment to pregnancy,” “substance use and abuse,” “housing/household,” and “education/employment.”34
Poor mothers are interrogated about topics that have little to no connection
with their physical health, the well-being of the fetus, or their ability to parent.35 The State’s questions vary from the quotidian to the highly sensitive.
Was the pregnancy planned?36 How many sexual partners has she had?37 What
are her strategies for preventing future pregnancies?38 Has she ever had any
marital or family problems?39 Has she ever experienced sexual assault or domestic violence?40 Has she ever been homeless?41 Has she ever struggled with
mental illness?42 Has she ever used drugs or alcohol?43 Has she ever ex-

31
See infra notes 37-48- and accompanying text (describing inquiries State poses to poor
mothers during medical assessments).
32
See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 1-2 (listing numerous assessments required before
pregnant women receive medical care under California’s Medicaid regulations).
33
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22,
§ 51348(e)(1)(A) (2012)).
34
Id. at 2, 111 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 51348(e)(1)(A) (2012)).
35
See id. at 111-12, 164-66 (characterizing interrogations as social interventions rather
than physical assessments).
36
Id. at 111 (“Poor pregnant women in New York must . . . undergo[] a screening that
asks about the unplanned-ness and/or unwantedness of the current pregnancy . . . .”).
37
See id. at 166 (discussing poor pregnant women being forced to answer questions
about “sexual adventurous[ness]”).
38
Id. at 7 (discussing “inquiries about women’s . . . strategies for preventing the conception and birth of more children”).
39
Id. at 111.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. (“Poor pregnant women in New York must . . . undergo[] a screening that asks
about . . . [their] history of psychiatric treatment or emotional disturbance . . . .”).
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changed sex for money or gifts?44 What is her highest level of education?45
Was she ever expelled from high school?46 Has she ever been arrested or convicted of a crime?47 Has she ever been found guilty of possessing contraband?48
As Professor Bridges explains, the State’s interrogations are rooted in the
moral construction of poverty.49 Under that construction, the pregnant mother’s
defective character is the cause of her indigence.50 Race contributes to this
construction—racial minorities are disproportionately represented among the
poor.51 As President Ronald Reagan made famous with his description of the
“welfare queen,” indigent black motherhood is caricatured as sexually irresponsible, lazy, and deviant.52
The State’s interrogations reflect the moral construction of poverty by attaching “pathology . . . to poor bodies.”53 Why would the State demand information about a poor mother’s history with abortion, prostitution, school expulsion, criminality, sexual abuse, mental illness, and homelessness if not for the
State’s belief that she is a person of defective character? The State’s questions
say that poor mothers are the type of people who abuse drugs, sell sex, commit
crimes, and engage in behavior that would warrant suspension from school.54
Because a poor mother’s poverty is taken to suggest a flawed character that
may cause her to mistreat her child, the State “always has the authority to infringe” her privacy.55

43

Id. at 166 (noting that poor pregnant women are often asked whether they have “been
addicted to drugs” or “abused alcohol”).
44
Id. at 174 (“She may have to reveal that she has broken moral norms dictating that
sexual intercourse . . . should never be exchanged for money or gifts.”).
45
Id. at 167.
46
Id. at 166.
47
See id. at 167 (arguing that poor mothers should not have to answer questions regarding “punishment by the criminal justice system”).
48
Id. at 166.
49
See id. at 113 (“[The State’s interrogations] reveal that poor women are less valuable
members of the body politic.”).
50
See id. at 7 (discussing how moral construction of poverty leads to “idea that people
are poor because something is wrong with them”).
51
See id. at 33 (“It is easy to moralize poverty when those who are disproportionately
impoverished are racial Others.”).
52
See id. at 54 (discussing how President Reagan’s stories of “welfare queen” reflected
“a culture wherein black people have been constructed as sexually lascivious[,] . . . intractably indolent” and “apotheosis of immorality”).
53
Id. at 113.
54
See id. at 149 (noting that “the pursuit of full information about an individual poor
mother would not even be attempted without the baseline supposition about the group to
which she belongs”).
55
Id. at 114 (emphasis in original).
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Evidence that the State’s surveillance of poor mothers has fulfilled its stated
goal to protect children is scant. State surveillance has, however, resulted in
grave harm to children. In a recent case, state workers placed a newborn into
foster care based on concerns that the mother’s poverty would prevent her
from providing basic necessities for her child.56 The infant died roughly three
months later while in foster care.57 The foster parents could have prevented the
baby’s death with a firm mattress.58
As The Poverty of Privacy Rights illuminates, the State’s interrogations
strike a powerful blow to poor mothers’ sense of self-worth. The State’s message is that poor mothers “do not have equal standing in the nation’s cultural
imagination.”59 Rather than equal citizens of the state, they are subjects of a
state that sees them as a social problem.60 The State’s interrogations suggest
that uninsured mothers are diseased, broken, and incompetent, whereas insured
mothers are told no such thing.61 They say that poor mothers’ destructive
tendencies must be tracked to prevent harm to their children.62 The state’s
“dignity-harming interrogations . . . insult poor pregnant women” and construct
them as “second-class citizens.”63
The State’s collection imperative carries downstream risks. Information
stored in government databases is notoriously insecure.64 The State’s digital

56
Mark Douglas, Pinellas Parents Bury Newborn Who Died in Pasco Foster Care,
WFLA (Nov. 7, 2017, 6:21 PM), http://wfla.com/2017/11/07/pinellas-parents-bury-newborn
-who-died-in-pasco-foster-care/ [perma.cc/C4GJ-LHBX].
57
Id. (reporting that baby was placed in foster care after July 29, 2017, and died on October 24, 2017).
58
See id. (noting that foster parents “failed to follow [foster care agency’s] baby safety
checklist that says all infants should sleep in a crib with a firm mattress and tight-fitting
sheets without other materials that might suffocate a baby” and instead put baby to sleep in
adult bed).
59
BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 113.
60
Id. at 7-8 (“If personal failures are the presumptive cause of poverty, then poor mothers ought to be supervised closely, as their personal failures necessarily implicate children.”
(emphasis in original)).
61
Id. at 149 (noting different ways that mothers are treated based on financial conditions).
62
See id. at 12 (arguing that “if poor mothers have not been given privacy rights . . . because their behavioral or ethical flaws necessarily implicate children, these flaws would also
explain why have [sic] been given ineffective privacy rights”).
63
Id. at 121.
64
The breach of the federal Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) is a prominent
example of the vulnerability of government databases. See Maria Korolov, The OPM Data
Breach 2 Years On: What Government Agencies Must Do Now, CSO (June 20, 2017, 3:00
AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3201041/data-breach/the-opm-data-breach-2-years
-on-what-government-agencies-must-do-now.html [perma.cc/SQZ2-K2U4] (discussing aftermath of OPM breach, which left vulnerable nearly twenty-two million Social Security
numbers, over one million fingerprints, and individuals’ criminal and financial histories).
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dossiers about poor mothers may be subject to data leaks and hacks.65 A common source of data breaches involves public hospitals where the personal data
of poor mothers is collected and stored.66 Personal data extracted from poor
pregnant women could be used to create risk profiles that could justify searches of their homes in the name of child protection. Government-generated risk
profiles, in turn, can result in what Professor Margaret Hu has aptly called “Big
Data Blacklisting.”67 Risk profiles can be shared with a host of federal and
state agencies, impacting poor mothers’ opportunities, from government employment to immigration.68
Poor mothers cannot avoid state surveillance by declining to seek government-assisted prenatal care. When the State learns that uninsured pregnant
women are not getting prenatal care, it commences surveillance.69 If a poor
woman comes to a hospital for delivery and she has not been receiving prenatal
care, then the hospital will likely hold the infant until the state inspects the
mother’s home.70 Child protective services will interrogate the mother to determine her competence to raise children absent the State’s intervention and

65
Cf. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data
Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 747-73 (2018) (discussing prevalence of data breaches
today and judicial system’s difficulty in identifying their harm).
66
See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH REPORT iv
(2016) (noting that in California sixteen percent of breaches were within healthcare sector
and involving medical information, including patient records and Social Security numbers);
Citron, supra note 11, at 786-88 (discussing state attorney general’s offices’ responses to
consumer privacy issues and noting that health privacy and data security are areas of focus
for Massachusetts and Connecticut attorney general’s offices given “outgrowth of the high
concentration of hospitals and insurance companies within their borders”).
67
Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2016) (“‘Big data
blacklisting’ is the process of categorizing individuals as administratively ‘guilty until proven innocent’ by virtue of suspicious digital data and database screening results.”).
68
See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1443 (2011); Gray & Citron, supra note 4,
at 80-81 (“Governmental data-mining systems have flagged innocent individuals as persons
of interest, leading to their erroneous classifications as terrorists or security threats, intense
scrutiny at airports, denial of travel, false arrest, and loss of public benefits.”).
69
See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 113, 124-133 (2011) (discussing New York State Prenatal Care Assistance Program and noting that to receive benefits, women are required to divulge information regarding recent nutritional intake and undergo examinations including psychological assessments).
70
See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 9; see also id. at 131 (“The failure to receive prenatal
care is a form of ‘neglect,’ and that justifies the state’s intervention into the family to ‘protect’ the child.”).
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regulation.71 The State presumes that if poor mothers lack insurance, they cannot provide basic necessities for their children.72
In short, the existential state of poor mothers is one of unavoidable state
surveillance. If poor mothers accept government assistance for medical care,
they lose their privacy. If poor mothers do not obtain Medicaid, they lose their
privacy.73 The “legal and social condition of poor mothers is one that is devoid
of privacy—one in which state power surrounds them at all times, without regard to whether they receive public benefits.”74
Poor mothers are denied privacy because the State assumes nothing valuable
will come from their freedom from surveillance.75 The State subjects poor
mothers to surveillance because it views their character as suspicious.76 Poor
mothers are denied the “right to an inviolate personality,” as Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis articulated the concept of privacy in their famous law review article The Right to Privacy.77 State surveillance is designed to bring poor
mothers “away from the margins of thought and behavior and toward the
mainstream.”78 As Professor Bridges explains, the poor mother’s lack of privacy is “not a function of [her] dependence on state aid; it is a function of [her]
poverty.”79
B.

Due Process Turn

The Poverty of Privacy Rights considers the State’s surveillance of poor
mothers in light of a series of cases in which the Supreme Court has tentatively
recognized a constitutional right to information privacy.80 In Whalen v. Roe,81
the Court raised the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause protects individuals against the improper collection, aggregation, or
disclosure of their private information.82 In Whalen, a group of patients and

71

See id. at 10 (noting that if poor mothers refuse government assistance, they will still
lose their privacy “because they will be unable to provide their children with basic necessities, thus making them vulnerable to a privacy-invading investigation”).
72
See id. at 9-10.
73
Id. at 131.
74
Id. at 10.
75
Id. at 153 (“We want to prevent [poor mothers] from experimenting with behaviors
that are unpopular or countercultural, as we do not trust that anything valuable will result
from their experimentation.”).
76
See id. at 154 (“[D]enying poor mothers privacy is a mechanism for bringing a problematized segment of society into conformity.”).
77
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
211 (1890).
78
BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 154.
79
Id. at 132.
80
See id. at 157-58.
81
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
82
Id. at 598-600.

2018]

A POOR MOTHER’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY

1149

doctors challenged a New York statute requiring the centralized collection of
the names and addresses of individuals taking “Schedule II” drugs, for which
there were legal and illegal markets.83 The goal of the database was to help the
State detect the diversion of drugs into illegal markets.84 Plaintiffs argued the
law illegitimately burdened their “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters.”85
In Whalen, the Court set the stage for the recognition of a right to information privacy: “The cases sometimes characterized as protecting ‘privacy’
have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”86 The
Court acknowledged: “the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive
government files” arising from the “collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction
of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws.”87
The Court began by noting that the State’s collection of prescription data
was an “essential part of modern medical practice” though it did risk stigmatizing patients.88 The Court upheld the statute, finding the State’s interest in detecting drug crimes outweighed the Plaintiffs’ privacy interest, because the
Plaintiffs’ data was adequately secured.89 According to Justice Brennan’s concurrence, had there been a real risk of disclosure to unauthorized individuals,
the State’s amassing of Plaintiffs’ health data might have raised constitutional
concerns.90 The Court also noted the absence of evidence suggesting that the
State’s data collection chilled Plaintiffs from taking medicine.91
Since Whalen, the Supreme Court has suggested twice that a substantive due
process right to informational privacy exists, but the law challenged in each
case did not violate this right because safeguards prevented the unwarranted
disclosure of personal information.92 In National Aeronautics and Space Ad-

83

Id. at 595.
Id. at 591-92.
85
Id. at 599.
86
Id. at 599-600.
87
Id. at 605. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan similarly warned that “central storage
and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that
information . . . .” Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
88
Id. at 602 (majority opinion).
89
Id. at 601-02 (noting that there is only “remote possibility” that the information will be
inadequately protected, which is “not a sufficient reason for invalidating the entire patientidentification program”).
90
Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91
Id. at 604 (majority opinion).
92
BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 157-58 (discussing Nixon v. GSA and NASA v. Nelson).
84
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ministration v. Nelson,93 low risk contract employees at a government laboratory challenged background checks that required them to answer questions
about their emotional health, drug treatment, and psychological counseling.94
In Nelson, the Court held that the government’s interests in managing its operations, combined with protections to secure the information, satisfied plaintiffs’ “‘interest in avoiding disclosure’ that may ‘arguably ha[ve] its roots in
the Constitution.’”95 The Court underscored that the Privacy Act of 1974 adequately protected plaintiffs’ information by requiring their written consent before disclosing it to third parties and by imposing criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of their information.96
Beyond the Supreme Court, lower courts have recognized a constitutional
right to information privacy where the State has inappropriately disclosed individuals’ personal data.97 Some circuits have protected information implicating
fundamental rights like family relationships, procreation, and contraception.98
Others have protected information about which individuals enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy.99
For the most part, courts have refused to acknowledge—let alone balance—
the harm caused by the State’s collection of personal information.100 Consider
a due process challenge to a state law that required parents receiving government funding for childcare to submit finger scans when dropping off and picking up their children.101 In that case, the Plaintiff argued that submitting her
finger scan in front of other parents and teachers was humiliating because it
marked her as a welfare recipient.102 The Court refused to consider the stigma
93

562 U.S. 134 (2011).
Id. at 138.
95
Id. at 138 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599).
96
Id. at 147.
97
BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 158 (“Although the Supreme Court has never announced
definitively that a right to information privacy exists, the circuits have trudged ahead and
recognized the right.”). Courts generally engage in a balancing of interests to determine
whether the government’s interest is sufficiently important and narrowly tailored to compel
the collection of personal data. Id. There is some variance among the circuits, however, as to
whether burdens on this right are reviewed on the intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny
standard. See id.
98
Id. (“Some circuits only protect the privacy of information that implicates fundamental
rights . . . .”).
99
Id.
100
Id. at 158 (arguing that current culture of blaming poor mothers for their situation has
led to failure by courts to properly balance between privacy interest of individual and interest of government).
101
Id. at 159-60 (discussing how Williams v. Berry, 977 F. Supp. 2d 621 (S.D. Miss.
2013) failed to appreciate mother’s interest in privacy).
102
Id. at 159 (“[B]ecause only beneficiaries of the Mississippi Child Care Payment Program were required to use the finger scanning technology, her status as a program beneficiary was disclosed to all those around her whenever she used the technology . . . .”).
94
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caused by the State’s collection efforts as implicating the constitutional right to
information privacy.103 For the Court, only the State’s disclosure of the Plaintiff’s finger scans to unauthorized third parties would implicate the right to information privacy.104
Professor Bridges offers a thicker, more contextual conception of the constitutional right to information privacy than courts have recognized.105 As Professor Bridges argues, courts should assess the State’s collection of individuals’
personal data, not just the subsequent disclosure of that personal data.106 The
State can infringe on a person’s “right to be let alone” through its collection,
aggregation, use, or disclosure of information.107
Indeed, there are some aspects of a person’s life in which the government
has no legitimate interest and whose collection undermines self-respect and autonomy. Individuals have the right not to be known if the State’s questions
would demean and humiliate them for no good reason.108 Privacy honors human dignity by conferring “respect for individual choice” and “respect for individuals because they have the capacity for choice.”109 “What makes a pursuit
of information degrading does not turn on whether the information being pursued can be linked back to a specific individual or whether it is sensitive; rather, the degrading character of the pursuit turns on the assumptions made
about the person that are motivating the interrogation.”110
In the case of government-funded prenatal programs, crucial aspects of the
State’s interrogations have little to do with healthy parenting and much to do
with the State’s ability to control and demean poor mothers.111 When the State
demands to know a poor mother’s history of abortion, sexual abuse, school ex103

Id.
Id.
105
Id. at 154 (arguing that society gives privacy rights to practices that it values and that
by not giving poor mothers more privacy protection, society implicitly suggests that their
lives are not socially valuable).
106
See id. at 162 (describing how courts frame issue as whether government can protect
information from being released to unauthorized individuals).
107
Id. (arguing that “it is degrading when the government asks the question and collects
the information in the first instance”). As Justice Brandeis noted in a dissent, “the right to be
let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
108
Cf. BRIDGES, supra note 20 at 166 (describing how courts have not recognized “interest that individuals . . . have in avoiding these harms to dignity”).
109
Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 208
(2011); cf. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 77, at 195, 198 (“The common law secures to
each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments,
and emotions shall be communicated to others. Under our system of government, he can
never be compelled to express them (except when upon the witness-stand) . . . .”).
110
BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 162.
111
See id. at 166 (displaying set of questions that women must answer for Medicaid that
have little or nothing to do with health or parenting).
104
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pulsions, and criminal convictions, it forces her to admit to a stigmatized social
position.112
Even if poor mothers have nothing embarrassing to reveal, the State’s interrogations are corrosive. They tell poor mothers that they are the type of people
who are likely to have stigmatizing information to reveal. The poor mother
“may experience the interrogation as doubly painful both because it facilitates
social control while at the same time revealing her as the type of person that
society wants to control.”113
II.

A NEW PRIVACY

The Poverty of Privacy Rights has the potential to shape the Supreme
Court’s understanding of substantive due process protections owed to vulnerable members of society. In an earlier age, the legal scholarship of Professor
Charles Reich revolutionized our thinking about procedural due process protections afforded the indigent. Reich’s The New Property and related work
published in the 1960s called for a “Bill of Rights for the disenfranchised.”114
In Goldberg v. Kelly,115 the Court embraced Reich’s vision, recognizing procedural due process protections for the indigent whose public benefits were in
jeopardy of termination.116 Though the Court has not taken up Reich’s call for
a constitutional right that would carve out a zone of privacy for the indigent,117
The Poverty of Privacy Rights charts a theory for such a right.
This Part explores the book’s parallels to Reich’s The New Property. It highlights the contributions that Professor Bridges makes to our understanding of
the constitutional right to information privacy. The Poverty of Privacy Rights
lays the groundwork for a “new privacy” by offering a more robust and contextual understanding of the privacy rights at stake. This Part ends with suggestions for the agenda at the heart of The Poverty of Privacy Rights, and urges us
to look beyond the U.S. Constitution to address the erosion of privacy rights.
A.

The Scholarship of Charles Reich

In 1964, Professor Charles Reich published The New Property, which poverty law scholar David Super has described as “one of the most influential arti112

See id. at 167 (explaining how collecting private information from poor mothers can
harm them even if they have nothing embarrassing to reveal).
113
Id. at 168.
114
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 760 (1964) (describing how
oppressive government impairs individual’s enjoyment of rights).
115
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
116
Id. at 271 (requiring that decision-maker’s conclusion as to welfare recipient’s eligibility complies with certain procedural guidelines); see also Reich, supra note 114, at 783
(describing how procedure provides strong safeguard against arbitrary government action).
117
See Reich, supra note 114, at 785 (“[T]here must be a zone of privacy for each individual beyond which neither government nor private power can push—a hiding from the allpervasive system of regulation and control.”).
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cles of the last century.”118 The New Property explored the power of the administrative state over individuals’ freedom.119 The State was a “gigantic syphon,” dispensing entitlements that often took the “form of rights or status rather than of tangible goods.”120 As Reich explained, almost everyone received
government entitlements, such as licenses, employment, contracts, tax breaks,
and public benefits.121 The importance of those entitlements often exceeded
that of traditional forms of wealth like homes or bank accounts.122
Reich warned that the State acquired troubling power over citizens’ lives
with the expansion of government entitlements.123 The more government
“hands out something of value, whether a relief check or a television license,”
the more power it has to supervise that aspect of people’s lives.124 The government investigated, monitored, and harassed recipients of its “largess[e].”125
State interrogations were often expensive, embarrassing, and invasive.126 The
state could affix a “black mark” on recipients that would haunt them far into
the future.127 When subject to the State’s control, individuals had “no hiding
place.”128 Not even the home was sacred—agencies frequently conducted midnight raids of benefits recipients’ residences.129 State surveillance and control
impaired “individualism and independence.”130
Individuals who defied the State’s conditions—no matter how arbitrary or
invasive—could be punished with the suspension or revocation of government
entitlements.131 Individuals could do little in response because entitlements
118

Id. at 744; see David A. Super, The New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773,
1779 (2013).
119
See Reich, supra note 114, at 733.
120
Id. at 733, 737-38.
121
Id. at 739-46.
122
See id. at 738-39 (describing that sources of income or rights to receive income are
primary form of wealth dispensed by government and how this can be most meaningful distinctive wealth that individuals possess).
123
See id. at 746 (noting that when government offers entitlements, it begins to supervise
entitlement recipients).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 749-50 (providing examples of agencies using their powers arbitrarily with constituents).
126
See id. at 750 (explaining that use of surveillance alone would be enough to make
people uncomfortable).
127
Id. at 759-60.
128
Id. at 760.
129
See id. at 761 (explaining that Sunday mornings and after midnight were best for detecting fraud through unannounced visits).
130
Id. at 733.
131
See id. at 747 (explaining that recipient’s moral character could be punished with denial of government largesse). For example, licenses were denied longshoremen because they
had criminal records and mothers were denied aid for their children because of their alleged
bad character. Id.
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were treated like gifts or privileges that were conditional and subject to the
state’s discretion.132 For Reich, an antidote to the abuses of the “public interest
state” would include the recognition of property rights in government entitlements.133 Individuals needed to “possess, in whatever form, a small but sovereign island of his own” to protect their liberty.134
Reich prescribed procedural and substantive protections of individuals’
property interests in government entitlements. He argued that scrupulous observance of fair procedures was essential to restrain arbitrary government action.135 Then too, government should be prevented from using its largesse to
“‘buy up’ rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”136 There should be “a zone of
privacy for each individual beyond which neither government nor private power can push—a hiding place from the all-pervasive system of regulation and
control.”137 Lastly, legislatures should ensure that the “regulation of largess[e]”
does not “become a handle for regulating everything else.”138
Reich argued that vulnerable members of society warranted particular attention.139 His scholarship argued that state power impacted groups differently, to
the rich’s benefit and the poor’s disadvantage.140 Welfare regulation “impose[d] a standard of moral behavior” that existed in no other area of government entitlement.141 It subjected the poor to surveillance amounting to a “deep
invasion of [their] freedom.”142 “It [was] only the poor whose entitlements, alt-

132
Cf. id. at 749 (noting that government could very easily rationalize increase in regulation to accompany new entitlements).
133
Id. at 778.
134
Id. at 774.
135
See id. at 783 (“Action should be open to hearing and contest, and based upon a record subject to judicial review.”). David Super explains that “[a]lthough Reich advocated developing [procedural] rules for governments’ administration of largesse, he expressed great
skepticism that they could rein in arbitrary power.” Super, supra note 118, at 1780.
136
Reich, supra note 114, at 779.
137
Id. at 785.
138
Id. at 782.
139
See id. at 777 (arguing that abrogating rights of poor for “the public interest is no justification for the erosion of freedom that has resulted from the present system of government
largess”).
140
See id. at 773 (discussing reforms in which corporations passed some power to government, creating system of “combined power” that “presses against the individual”). As
Sarah Seo explains, Reich did not pay particular attention to how race or class “aggravated
the problem of police discretion” in automobile stops. Sarah A. Seo, The New Public, 125
YALE L.J. 1616, 1645 (2016). However, he did acknowledge that “the police are far more
likely to stop a Negro than a white man; far more likely to question a shabbily dressed man
than one in an expensive suit.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Charles A.
Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1164 (1966)).
141
Reich, supra note 24, at 1247.
142
Reich, supra note 114, at 758.
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hough recognized by public policy, have not been effectively enforced.”143 Too
often, government entitlements for the poor were treated as “charity” rather
than as “essentials, fully deserved.”144
In The New Property, a companion piece to Individual Rights and Social
Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, Reich argued that the recognition of
property rights in public benefits was “urgently needed” to secure a “minimum
basis for individual well-being and dignity.”145 Public benefits were no different from government entitlements granted to wealthier segments of society.146
They “aid security and independence” in the same way that professional licenses, farmers’ subsidies, and social security pensions do.147 Eligibility safeguards for welfare benefits and limits on the “visitorial powers of the state”
were essential to ensure the poor’s liberty and self-respect.148
B.

Due Process Rights for the Poor

Reich’s scholarship was profoundly influential. In Goldberg v. Kelly, decided in 1970, the Court addressed the procedures owed individuals before the
State could terminate welfare benefits.149 Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, made clear that low-income people had the same procedural rights as
the affluent.150 Citing Reich’s scholarship, the Court found that welfare benefits were property interests protected by the Due Process Clause.151 Lowincome individuals had a right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard before the termination of welfare benefits, the same as any other government entitlement.152 The Court held that public benefits were not charity or

143

Reich, supra note 24, at 1255.
Id.
145
Reich, supra note 114, at 785-86.
146
See id. at 785 (“The presumption should be that the professional man will keep his
license, and the welfare recipient his pension.”).
147
Reich, supra note 24, at 1255.
148
Id. at 1256.
149
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260 (1970).
150
Id. at 262 (citing Reich’s articles).
151
See id. at 262-64 (noting importance of welfare to indigent persons that are qualified
recipients). This is not to suggest that, following Goldberg, courts have been expansive in
their understanding of the poor’s property rights, as Reich had hoped. As David Super explains, “[e]ven in procedural due process, defining which property rights are protected has
proven continuously problematic.” Super, supra note 118, at 1828. The Court has had difficulty shedding “the distinction between rights and privileges.” Id. Then too, courts have
struggled with “how much of the legal, social, and economic context that gives rights their
meaning should be included in the definitions of rights.” Id. at 1829. Also, courts have “allowed legislatures to avoid creating property rights in public benefit programs with limitations that are substantive in name only.” Id.
152
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (requiring pre-termination evidentiary hearing to fulfill
procedural due process requirements before welfare is terminated).
144
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a “privilege,” but rather were a person’s property, such as state licenses, farmer
subsidies, or corporate tax exemptions.153
Reich’s call for procedural due process protections for the indigent was answered in Goldberg. The question remained as to whether substantive due process set limits on the State’s “all-pervasive” surveillance of the poor, as Reich
had urged.154 In Whalen, decided six years after Goldberg, the Court alluded to
a right to information privacy.155 Whalen and its progeny did not articulate a
robust constitutional theory capable of addressing the pervasive surveillance of
welfare recipients.156
The Poverty of Privacy Rights is an important step towards a “bill of rights
for the disinherited.”157 It provides a theory on which a right to information
privacy for the vulnerable can be built. It imagines a substantive due process
right that would limit or prohibit a state’s collection of personal data that
serves no justifiable purpose and erodes individual dignity and liberty.158 It
would “override the government’s interest in asking demeaning questions” if
the answers would not advance the state’s legitimate interests.159
A substantive right to information privacy, as developed in The Poverty of
Privacy Rights, would have a structural impact. It would provide a “systemictype remedy to address system-wide harms.”160 It would say that poor mothers
are citizens of the state, worthy of privacy and respect, rather than subjects of
the State, deserving suspicion.161 Shielded from demeaning state interrogations, uninsured, poor mothers would be put on equal footing to insured,
153

Id. at 262 n.8.
Reich, supra note 114, at 785 (calling for “zone of privacy” to protect individuals
from government’s control).
155
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977) (highlighting how duty to “avoid
unwarranted disclosures” of certain personal information may have “its roots in the Constitution” but not deciding whether such disclosure would be unconstitutional).
156
See Reich, supra note 24, at 1254 (“[T]he law has not yet developed a constitutional
theory of privacy fully adequate to the present-day interdependent world.”).
157
Id. at 1257.
158
See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 167 (“[I]f our courts were concerned about protecting
the dignity of all individuals in the polity, then the Constitution might be interpreted to require that the state only collect information that is necessary to determine the level of benefits a person should receive and that facilitates her connection to other social services only if
she desires that connection.”).
159
Id. at 165.
160
Hu, supra note 67, at 1797. Professor Margaret Hu argues that national security Big
Data programs, such as the Terrorist Watch List and No Fly List, invade privacy on a mass,
systemic scale and thus should be addressed with the systemic approach of substantive due
process. See id. Her future scholarship will tackle the analytical framework of substantive
due process for government’s big data scoring, ranking, and rating programs. See id. at
1798.
161
Cf. BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 166 (highlighting shame associated with forcing poor
mothers to reveal personal information).
154
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wealthier mothers who are not similarly interrogated.162 Preserving a poor
mother’s right to privacy would “produce an equality of treatment between
poor and non-poor mothers, even when the narratives that are told about the
two sets of mothers are far from equal.”163
A constitutional right to information privacy has the potential to impact
democratic participation. Respecting privacy would further individual autonomy and democratic participation by ensuring that people see themselves as capable of self-governance.164 The State would be precluded from engaging in
interrogations that disenfranchise poor mothers more than they already are.
C.

Beyond the Constitution

The Constitution is a crucial tool to address the erosion of the poor’s privacy
rights, but it is not the only tool. The tendency to reify the Constitution can
prevent the pursuit of other fruitful avenues for reform.165 Positive law, state
constitutions, and corporate practices can help protect poor mothers’ privacy
and freedom as well.166
A reform agenda should include the offices of state attorneys general. State
enforcers have been active privacy norm entrepreneurs since the late 1990s.167
They have pioneered baseline privacy norms to protect their citizens, relying
on unfair and deceptive acts and practice (“UDAP”) laws.168 Several offices
have devoted resources to investigating Big Data efforts that disadvantage the
poor.169 In my scholarship, I have called on state enforcers to “investigate unfair and deceptive uses of scoring algorithms given their potential to further
marginalize vulnerable populations.”170

162

Cf. id. (calling attention to fact that wealthy mothers do not face same questioning and
regulation as poor mothers).
163
Id. at 169.
164
See Brief for Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011) (No. 09-530) (explaining that right to informational self-determination “prevents any processing of personal data
that leads to an inspection of or an influence upon a person that is capable of destroying an
individual capacity for self-governance”).
165
See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Essential Preconditions to Digital Expression (You Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1375-85 (2018) (discussing other avenues for reform).
166
Id.
167
See Citron, supra note 11, at 749 (outlining involvement of state attorneys general
with privacy enforcement since the 1990s).
168
Id. at 750-54 (giving overview of efforts of state attorneys general to enforce privacy
norms).
169
See id. at 809-10 (noting certain uses of big data that should be on agendas of state
attorneys general, such as unfair and deceptive uses of scoring algorithms and cell phone
apps for stalking).
170
Id. at 810.
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Although state attorney general (“AG”) privacy policymaking tends to focus
on private uses of personal data, it can address the state’s aggregation of unnecessary and embarrassing personal data. State AG offices could look to state
constitutions to challenge state regulations requiring the collection of extraneous—and stigmatizing—personal data from indigent mothers.
California’s AG office would have strong support for such a challenge.171
Article I of the California Constitution guarantees to all people the inalienable
right to privacy.172 The privacy provision was added to the state constitution
pursuant to a ballot initiative aimed to curtail overbroad and unnecessary collections of personal data.173 The provision addressed the “accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance
and data collection activity in contemporary society.”174 As the California Supreme Court has held, the state needs to show a compelling interest to justify
invading “autonomy-based privacy rights, particularly in the areas of free expression and association, procreation, or government-provided benefits in areas
of basic human need.”175 The California Supreme Court held that a law requiring public employees to submit to polygraph testing to investigate specific
crimes violated employees’ privacy rights under the state constitution.176

171
So too would private litigants. See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
77, 86 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding that Target’s use of psychological profiling device that required job applicants to answer questions about religious beliefs and sexual orientation violated applicants’ privacy rights under state constitution).
172
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472,
479 (Cal. 2009) (holding that right to privacy applies to state actors and private parties).
173
See CAL. BALLOT PROPOSITIONS AND INITIATIVES, PROPOSITION 11: RIGHT OF PRIVACY
27 (UC Hastings Scholarship Repository 1972). California state senator James E. Whitmore
opposed the initiative because he believed it would make it more difficult for the government to investigate welfare fraud. Id. at 27-28. The ballot’s key legislative proponents argued that “[p]roposition 11 will not prevent the government from collecting any information
it legitimately needs. It will only prevent misuse of this information for unauthorized purposes and preclude the collection of extraneous or frivolous information.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
174
White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233 (Cal. 1975).
175
Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 663 (Cal. 1994). The California
Supreme Court has employed a balancing test, rather than strict scrutiny, when the privacy
interest does not infringe on autonomy or when the data collection does not concern public
benefits in areas of basic need. Id. at 678. For example, in Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d
1011 (Cal. 2017), the court upheld the state medical board’s access to a patients’ prescription records in an investigation of a doctor. The court held that even assuming the board’s
actions constituted a serious intrusion on a legally protected privacy interest, the State’s access to the doctor’s prescription records was justified by their interest in protecting the public from the unlawful sale of dangerous drugs and protecting patients from negligent physicians. Id. at 1014.
176
Long Beach City Emps. Ass’n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 672 (Cal. 1986).
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State attorneys general also can influence government data collection practices through the legislative process.177 They could call for state legislation curtailing the collection of personal information from poor mothers. State legislatures should amend laws requiring poor mothers to answer demeaning
questions that have nothing to do with prenatal care or successful parenting.178
State legislation limiting the collection of personal data from poor mothers
would be crucial for expressive reasons. Law is our teacher and guide.179 It
shapes social norms and behavior.180 Revisions of state regulations would inform providers of state Medicaid programs that poor mothers should neither be
suspected of, nor interrogated about, stigmatizing behavior. Changes in state
laws could transform culture, which in turn could influence courts to interpret
due process “to bestow equal privacy rights to poor and wealthier mothers.”181
As Professor Bridges explains, “if history is a teacher, poor mothers will only
be granted privacy rights when cultural discourses around poverty shift as
well.”182 State lawmakers can help root out the moral construction of poverty.
Another avenue of reform involves front line workers responsible for welfare surveillance. Social workers and medical staff are entrusted with the task
of interrogating poor mothers.183 Due to the moral construction of poverty,
they may end up collecting far more personal data than the law requires.184
Their interrogations of poor mothers can be deeply humiliating.185 Bridges recalls an interview with a pregnant, poor woman who had several tattoos.186 The
first thing the doctor asked the woman was if her tattoo provider used clean
needles.187 The patient was devastated—the doctor’s question implied she was
the type of person who would go to an unlicensed, back alley tattoo provider.188
177

Citron, supra note 11, at 758.
See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 2-6.
179
See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 22-26 (2014) (arguing
that legal reforms spearheaded by civil rights activists have resulted in societal change);
Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment,
108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 407 (2009) [hereinafter Citron, Law’s Expressive Value] (“Law creates a public set of meanings and shared understandings between the state and the public. It
clarifies, and draws attention to, the behavior it prohibits. . . . Law educates the public about
what is socially harmful.”).
180
Citron, supra note 179, at 407.
181
BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 209-11.
182
Id. at 209.
183
See id. at 163-65 (describing experience of interrogation and data collection of one
pregnant black patient).
184
See id. at 166-67 (describing wide range of information that would be gathered from
such interrogations).
185
See id. at 163-65.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 163.
188
Id.
178
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Hospitals should include the moral construction of poverty in its training of
personnel. Staff should be taught about poverty bias and its corrosive impact
on patient care. Had the doctor been aware of the tendency to impute bad character to poor mothers, the doctor might not have asked the needless and embarrassing questions about the woman’s tattoo provider.
Progress is more likely if executives, lawmakers, and law enforcers view the
protection of poor mothers’ privacy rights as serving their interests. As Professor Derrick Bell has counseled, civil rights progress is most likely to occur
when the interests of vulnerable people can be aligned with those in the dominant group.189 Addressing poverty bias is in hospitals’ interest because humiliating questions shake a patient’s trust in medical providers.190 Without trust,
patients will be less inclined to share personal information essential for effective care. This lack of information can lead to bad medical outcomes and lawsuits, which hospitals and medical providers want to avoid.
Just as hospitals have some incentive to combat the moral construction of
poverty, so too might state lawmakers and law enforcers. Data privacy is a
pressing concern for constituents.191 The unraveling of privacy is underway in
the health arena.192 Employers provide incentives to employees who agree to
submit health data as part of wellness programs.193 Employees who refuse to
permit the collection of their health data are penalized because they are assumed to be withholding negative information, like a smoking habit.194 Viewed
189

See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 63-74 (1987) (explaining that progress on racial issues depends on ability to convince whites that they will benefit from social justice agenda); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber
Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 84-85 (2009) (heeding Professor Bell’s advice and arguing
that society suffers when law is brought to bear against online attacks that disproportionately impact women, people of color, and sexual minorities). Mary Anne Franks’s important
work has leveraged Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory to argue that the emerging
anti-surveillance sentiment should be transformed into what she calls “enlightened interest
convergence” that would seek to protect the privacy interests of the vulnerable. Mary Anne
Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 430 (2016). As Professor
Franks notes, a “democratic conception of privacy, by emphasizing the experiences of those
most vulnerable to its violation, offers the best chance of securing privacy for all.” Id.
190
See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 163-65 (describing one woman’s reluctance to go to
doctor because of humiliation related to interrogation procedures).
191
See, e.g., Citron, supra note 11, at 786-90 (exploring how constituents have serious
concerns about data breaches, identity theft, children’s privacy, unwanted telephone calls,
and other privacy and security issues).
192
Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Piracy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a
Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (2011) (“The [healthcare] field has
had the luxury of ignoring unraveling because technologies did not exist to make a signaling
economy possible. Those days are over.”).
193
See id. at 1167-69 (discussing phenomenon of digital monitoring and employer programs to incentivize employees to participate by providing health information).
194
See id. at 1156. Health insurance companies may insist upon the adoption of health
monitoring technologies to pass on the costs of nonconforming behavior like smoking. See
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in this way, everyone—from the poor to the affluent—may come to see that
they could be subject to invasive data collection.
Ultimately, the protection of poor mothers’ privacy rights could serve as a
step towards the protection of everyone’s privacy. It could force broader conversations about the data collection imperative, to which we now turn.
III. LAW, CONTEXT, AND RECIPROCITY
Rather than adopting technologies and techniques of perfect surveillance
and asking questions later, a systematic review of the data collection imperative is in order. The Poverty of Privacy Rights brings into view several threshold questions. Should the data collection imperative be permitted to continue
without end? What data collection efforts deserve careful study because they
risk abuse and exact costs to dignity, liberty, and democracy?
This Part briefly considers these broader questions in light of the government’s collection of personal data to protect against crimes, hazards, and terrorism. It discusses the role of the Fourth Amendment in limiting state surveillance designed to prevent and punish crimes and terrorism. Then, it considers
the role of reciprocity in evaluating the data collection imperative.
A.

Technologies of Perfect Surveillance

Since 9/11, government has significantly expanded surveillance over individuals’ everyday lives. As Professor David Gray astutely observed in The
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Surveillance, the goal “seems to be complete,
pervasive surveillance of everywhere we go in virtual and physical space, everything we do, everything we say, and everything we think.”195 Everyone is at
risk of state surveillance given the detailed data trail continuously created
about all of us.196 The “National Surveillance State”—as Jack Balkin calls it—
is “statistically oriented, ex ante and preventative, rather than focused on deterrence and ex post prosecution of individual wrongdoing.”197
To illustrate domestic-surveillance techniques, government agents and private-sector partners collect and share information and intelligence through a
network of fusion centers.198 With an “all hazards, all crimes, all threats” man-

id. at 1168-69 (“Some employers have tracked employees’ smoking habits even when the
employees are away from their place of work. Some have fired employees who engage in
behavior likely to raise the employer’s health insurance costs.”).
195
DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 5 (2017).
196
See FERGUSON, supra note 9, at 5 (warning that everyone is under surveillance and at
risk of big data policing).
197
Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1, 11 (2008).
198
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 68, at 1448 (defining “fusion centers” as “novel
sites of intergovernmental collaboration that generate and share intelligence and information”).
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date, “fusion centers cast a wide and indiscriminate net.”199 Fusion centers utilize private entities to gather personal information for them.200 Data brokers
specially design databases containing dossiers on hundreds of millions of
Americans for “fusion centers.”201 Data-mining tools analyze personal data
culled from public and private databases, biometric data, social media posts,
and public and private cameras.202
Governments employ technologies that continuously and indiscriminately
collect personal data. For instance, cell site simulators, known as “stingrays,”
“impersonate the cellular base stations that form the backbone of provider networks. . . . [T]hese devices can gather information from every cellular phone
within their ranges of operation—often hundreds or thousands of phones at a
time.”203 Cell site simulators enable law enforcement to “learn the unique identification numbers associated with each of these phones, their locations, and
basic information about communications and callers.”204 For most city dwellers, being tracked by a cell site simulator is routine.205
The more power the State acquires with surveillance technologies and techniques, the more Americans need protections that check that power.206 State
surveillance can lead to incorrect predictions about individuals that have a profound negative impact on their lives.207 As Reich warned fifty years ago, state
surveillance can create a “black mark” on someone’s record from which one
can never escape.208 It can demean and stigmatize, as The Poverty of Privacy
Rights illustrated.209 It can interfere with projects of personal exploration, self-

199
Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A
Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 264 (2013) (citation omitted).
200
See id.
201
Id.
202
See id.
203
GRAY, supra note 195, at 4.
204
Id. at 5.
205
Id. (noting that neighborhoods designated as “high crime” areas are routinely monitored).
206
Cf. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 68, at 1444-55 (discussing how lack of oversight in
domestic intelligence information sharing hubs erodes civil liberties); Richards, supra note
14, at 1952-58 (discussing potential injuries suffered by public as result of intellectual privacy infringement).
207
See Hu, supra note 68, at 1777-88 (discussing, for example, poor reliability of databases that inform screening protocols).
208
See Reich, supra note 114, at 759-80 (discussing consequences of criminal conviction). For thoughtful explorations of privacy harms in the digital age, see SOLOVE, supra
note 5; DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON
THE INTERNET (2007).
209
See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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development, and democratic culture.210 Government databases are subject to
data breaches that risk considerable financial harm and cause anxiety.211 Massive state collections of personal data can metastasize to countless other databases run by federal, state, and local agencies.212
A defining question is whether government will “protect[] individual dignity
and conform[] both public and private surveillance to the rule of law.”213 The
Fourth Amendment stands as a “critical bulwark[]” against abusive state surveillance.214 But legal doctrines have undermined the Fourth Amendment’s efficacy by allowing law enforcement to track individuals in public and to obtain
third-party records without a warrant.215 In Carpenter v. United States,216 the
Supreme Court reinvigorated the Fourth Amendment’s protections in finding
that the government needed a warrant to obtain cell site location data from the
defendant’s wireless carrier. For the Court, there was a qualitative difference
between analog records and digital technologies. The Court underscored that
cell phone location information generated by wireless carriers are “detailed,
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”217 The Court thus declined to extend
the third-party doctrine to the case due to the “unique nature of cell phone location records.”218 According to the Court, when the government “leverages
the technology of a wireless carrier,” individuals have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the record of their physical movements in public.219 The government conducted a search when it accessed cell site location data because the
tracking technology enabled perfect surveillance of a person’s whereabouts far
back in time.220 In concluding its findings, the Court harkened back to Justice

210

See, e.g., Citron & Gray, supra note 199, at 269-70 (illustrating how technological
information gathering “facilitates the sort of broad and indiscriminate surveillance that is
characteristic of a surveillance state”).
211
See Solove & Citron, supra note 65, at 738 (outlining various types of harm that result from data breach).
212
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 68, at 1484-87 (explaining scope of “network accountability” problem).
213
Balkin, supra note 197, at 4.
214
GRAY, supra note 195, at 69.
215
See Balkin, supra note 197, at 19-20 (outlining various instances of government surveillance that were held to fall outside Fourth Amendment protection). A case decided by
the Supreme Court this Term called into question the presumption that information collected
by private parties can be provided to the government without Fourth Amendment restrictions. Brief of Scholars of the History and Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018)
(No. 16-402).
216
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
217
Id. at 2216.
218
Id. at 2217.
219
Id.
220
See id. at 2219-20.
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Brandeis’s prescient dissent in Olmstead v. United States,221 which called for
vigilance to ensure that the “progress of science” did not erode Fourth
Amendment protections.222
Crucial to the Court’s decision was the method of surveillance—whether
digital technology permits “perfect surveillance” tantamount to the general
warrant and writs of assistance that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment abhorred.223 In a series of articles, David Gray and I argued that the Fourth
Amendment’s protections are implicated when the government uses technologies or investigative techniques that facilitate a broad, continuous, and indiscriminate collection of personal data that intrudes upon reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy.224 The government’s use of such technologies or
techniques would amount to a “search,” subject to the crucible of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness, including judicially enforced constraints on law
enforcement’s discretion.225 The Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter affirmed the substance of our argument and found that the Fourth Amendment
stands as a bulwark against technologies of perfect surveillance.
Might the constitutional right to information privacy serve as a check on
surveillance technologies or techniques that facilitate broad, indiscriminate,
and continuous collection of personal data? Due process would limit or block
surveillance programs that serve no legitimate state purpose beyond the State’s
exertion of control over people’s lives.226 Challenges to surveillance programs
would face the classic argument that needles cannot be found without the haystack.227 Some surveillance programs, however, have been shown to produce

221

277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (citing Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-474 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
223
See id. at 2218.
224
See Citron & Gray, supra note 199, at 270 (discussing history and significance of the
term “reasonable expectation of privacy”); David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 404-05 (2013) (discussing effect of mosaic theory on
traditional human surveillance); David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart,
Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745
(2013); Gray & Citron, supra note 4, at 71-72 (“Rather than asking how much information
is gathered in a particular case, we argue here that Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative privacy demand that we focus on how information is gathered.”).
225
See Gray & Citron, supra note 4, at 71-72.
226
See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 156 (citing Supreme Court’s openness to possibility
that informational privacy is protected by due process).
227
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 68, at 1450 (describing purpose of “fusion centers”
devoted to detecting and preventing crimes and threats through analyzing information,
which requires significant intelligence gathering).
222
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little value, as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board found of the
NSA’s bulk telephone records program.228
Professor Hu has argued that substantive due process should serve as a
check on government’s use of Big Data programs that deprive people of important rights.229 As Hu carefully documents, classified and non-classified
government programs categorize individuals as “administratively ‘guilty until
proven innocent’ by virtue of suspicious digital data and database screening
results.”230 As a result of “big data blacklisting,” people are deemed ineligible
to work, vote, and travel.231 Hu contends that substantive due process should
interrogate the “propriety of the mediation of a fundamental right in the first
instance.”232 Hu’s future work will explore whether a compelling state purpose
justifies “big data blacklisting” programs that imperil liberty.233
The constitutional right to information privacy could serve as a check on
government’s collection and use of personal data in the national surveillance
state.234 It raises important questions about the data collection imperative,
which underlies government’s use of technologies of perfect surveillance to
investigate crimes, hazards, and terrorism. The data collection imperative is
behind countless other surveillance projects in the private and public sector.235
Careful thought must be given to the benefits and costs of these projects and
the need, if any, for judicial, legislative, or administrative constraints before
their adoption.

228
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REP. ON THE TEL. RECORDS PROGRAM 16
(2014) (“The Section 215 bulk telephone records program . . . has shown only limited value.”).
229
See Hu, supra note 67, at 1797 (arguing that big data surveillance programs should be
subject to strict scrutiny analysis and that “[t]he government must show that its reliance on
big data is necessary and narrowly tailored to the use it is serving, and serves a compelling
state interest”).
230
Id. at 1747.
231
Id. at 1735 (introducing concept of “big data blacklisting” and describing increasing
use of databases to determine who can work, vote, and fly).
232
Id.
233
See id. at 1798 (“[F]uture scholarship on this subject will explore the analytical
framework of substantive due process in the context of the mass harms of big data blacklisting.”).
234
See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 133 (describing concept of “informational privacy” as
possibly referring to individuals’ ability to prevent government from disclosing information
it has collected about citizens, and noting that informational privacy might enjoy constitutional protection).
235
See, e.g., PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 228, at 1 (describing NSA program designed to collect “millions of telephone records”).
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B.

Reciprocity
Best practices and law often pair concerns about privacy with a commitment
to transparency and accountability.236 That tradition is built on a commitment
of reciprocity.237 When the State invades citizens’ privacy, it owes citizens a
reciprocal duty of transparency and accountability about its processes and decisions.238 The idea is to “watch the watchers.”239 The Privacy Act of 1974240
and the Freedom of Information Act241 embody the commitment of reciprocity
for the administrative state.
There is a flip side to reciprocity. What happens as government shields its
activities from view and loses any semblance of accountability? We have seen
trends pointing in that direction. In some states, police disciplinary records are
protected from public disclosure while criminal records plague citizens long
after their time has been served.242 Privatization often obscures what individual
officials did or decided.243 State surveillance is certainly most troubling—and
236
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 68, at 1471 (“America has a tradition of combining
concerns about privacy with guarantees of government openness.”). The Fair Information
Practices are built on the idea that private and public entities handling personal information
have reciprocal duties of transparency—that individuals have a right to know how their information is being handled; and accountability—that individuals can access personal records
and correct inaccuracies. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1670-81 (1999).
237
The federal Privacy Act of 1974 is indeed “the most ambitious piece of federal legislation in the domain of information privacy[,] . . . the most comprehensive law that regulates
processing and dissemination of information the government collects about individuals.”
Lior Strahelivitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2024 (2010).
238
This is a core commitment of procedural due process. See Danielle Keats Citron,
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1258 (2008) (articulating new
model of technological due process to guarantee transparency and accountability when automation threatens due process).
239
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 68, at 1471.
240
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012).
241
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)-(7) (2012) (pairing transparency in government operations and
processes with privacy protections for personnel and medical files and records compiled for
law enforcement purposes).
242
Kate Levine, We Need to Talk About Police Disciplinary Records, CITY SQUARE
(Aug. 7, 2017), http://urbanlawjournal.com/we-need-to-talk-about-police-disciplinaryrecords/ (noting, for example, that New York has statute protecting disciplinary records for
individual police officers); see also Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Defending the Public: Public
Accountability in the Courtroom, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1063, 1074 (2016) (outlining
heightened scrutiny that subpoenas for police records typically face when challenged in
court); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1228 (2017) (noting
that handful of states have laws limiting public access to police disciplinary records and that
police union contracts also limit even police chiefs’ ability to view and use disciplinary records).
243
See JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 79-81 (2017) (summarizing effect of privatization on separation of
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most hostile to the rule of law—when it amasses vast amounts of information
about citizens while shrouding the State’s operations in secrecy.244
As we take stock of the data collection imperative, concepts of reciprocity
should inform our evaluation. Concepts of reciprocity force into consideration
the disproportionate power acquired by government as it amasses reservoirs of
personal data about each and every one of us.245 Might reciprocity demand that
individuals have the right to be as unknown to government as it is to them?
Hints of a right not to be known have been recognized in some areas of the
law. For instance, the Supreme Court supported the NAACP’s efforts to keep
its membership lists away from segregationist state and local officials, finding
the right to avoid government scrutiny an integral part of the right of association.246
A right to be unknown would not be unlimited. Like other individual rights,
it could be overcome by compelling, specific claims of public necessity or by
an individual’s deliberate waiver of her privacy. But requiring government to
justify its surveillance or to show that individuals have surrendered their right
to be unknown would have the effect of requiring more focused, and less intrusive, data gathering.247
CONCLUSION
The Poverty of Privacy Rights powerfully advances the project of securing
privacy for the most vulnerable among us. It shows how the moral construction
of poverty animates the State’s surveillance of poor mothers, rather than legitimate concerns about prenatal care. State surveillance dispossesses poor mothers of their dignity and capacity for self-governance. Professor Bridges offers a
powers and noting that privatization can replace civil servants with for-profit contractors);
Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the
War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REV. 901, 901 (2008) (highlighting novel nature of private-public
partnership on intelligence gathering and informal nature of these relationships, which can
help to evade oversight and law).
244
See Balkin, supra note 197, at 17 (“The more power the state amasses, the more
Americans need constitutional guarantees to keep governments honest and devoted to the
public good.”). Frank Pasquale and I have suggested various ways to achieve accountability
for the domestic intelligence apparatus. Technical standards should render the collection and
sharing of personal data better subject to oversight and review. Citron & Pasquale, supra
note 68, at 1471 (proposing “network accountability” technical standards to promote accountability in surveillance). Legal redress mechanisms ought to speed the correction of inaccurate information. See, e.g., id. An independent board of experts, such as a Civil Liberties Protection Board, should be charged with performing broad cost-benefit analysis of
state surveillance, including a review of civil liberties and privacy protections.
245
See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing greater importance of accountability as governments gain more power).
246
NAACP v. Ala. ex. rel. Patterson, Attorney General, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
247
My current research is exploring the roles of reciprocity and fairness in data privacy
law.
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richer, contextual account of the constitutional right to information privacy that
would limit the State’s collection of personal data. Individuals have the right
not to be known if the State’s questions would demean and humiliate them for
no good reason.
The Poverty of Privacy Rights provides an important lens for rethinking the
data collection imperative more generally. It supplies a theory not only on
which a right to information privacy can be built but also on which positive
law and norms can develop. Concepts of reciprocity may provide another analytical tool to understand a potential right to be as unknown to government as it
is to us.

